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THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOCTRINE OF
IMPOSSIBILITY OF PERFORMANCE
I
N common with other systems of law, Anglo-American law has
grown in part by the use of analogies; and in part, by recep-
tions from other systems of law.
Analogy is a method by which every progressive.system of law
has grown. The principles, rules and standards which work well'in
one branch of the law are frequently taken over into other branches
of law which deal with different subjects. The success which attends
an attempt to develop law by analogy depends, to a large extent, on
the ability of the court which attempts to develop the law in this
way to work together the original rules of law and the rules and
principles borrowed by analogy. To take over a legal principle or
rule from one branch of law into another branch of law, dealing
with a different subject and controlled by different legal concepts,
may be very helpful if the principle or rule which is taken over
is so modified that it harmonzes with the general underlying
principles of the topic into which it has been carried. To refuse
to develop any given topic of the law by the free use of analogies
is to stunt its growth and arrest its development. On the other
hand, to add together different principles or rules taken from
different subjects without any attempt to work them together
into a consistent whole, may result in marvelous translations of the
law, but not in that progress which will today lay a foundation on
which tomorrow can build with safety.
While every system of law that has grown has done so by its
partial reception of other systems of law, the ready reception and
wholesale assimilation of other systems 'has characterized the
growth of the Anglo-American law, as it has characterized the
growth of the English language. Without this ready reception and
wholesale assimilation it couldsnever have developed from the law
of barbaric tribes into the law of the English-speaking races of the
world of today.
When the mist and fog of the Norman Conquest begin to clear
in the reign of Henry II, We find that the English law had been
receiving a large part of the feudal law of the continent, a reception
which was no doubt as unwilling as the English reception of Wil-
liam of Normandy as their lawful king, and as thorough. In the
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latter part of the eighteenth century .there occurred the last great
reception. in England of a body of extrinsic law-the reception of
the Law Merchant. If the Common Law had refused to receive the
Law Merchant, its own development would have been greatly
stunted. If Equity had received the Law Merchant, instead of the
Common Law, the jurisdiction of Equity would have been widened
enormously and the center of gravity of the unwritten law might
readily have shifted to Equity. If neither Equity nor Common Law
had received the Law Merchant, the courts of the Law Merchant
would in all probability have arisen by the side of the courts of the
Common Law and the courts of Equity; and the unwritten law would
have been broken into three divisions, instead of into two. As it
was, the reception of the Law Merchant by the Common Law con-
tributed in no small degree to the ability of the Common Law to
maintain its position by the side of Equity.
Between the reception of the feudal law after the Norman Con-
quest, and the reception of the Law Merchant during Mansfield's
control of the 'common law courts, a number of other receptions had
taken place. The law of testaments and legacies is marked by the
influence of the ecclesiastical law,.and as far as the courts of law
or equity take cognizance of such rights, they have received the
ecclesiastical law. In the United States the end of the eighteenth
century and the beginning of the nineteenth century were marked
by the reception of the Common Law and Equity of England, a
reception which is frequently overlooked by those who assume that
the law of the United States ought to be an exact replica of the
law of England-a reception which might possibly have been a
reception of French law instead of English law; and which, as it
turned out, was a reception of English law with many restrictions
and modifications.
In striking contrast to these different receptions of different bodies
of law was the determination of the common law courts to close
the register of writs, to refuse to recognize new forms of action,
and to refuse to recognize or to enforce the rights or to grant the
remedies which we have come to speak of as equitable. If a definite
body of principles and rules of equity had been worked out, outside
of England, and if they had come before the English courts as an
entire system, it is possible that the courts might have received them
as a more or less complete body of law. As it was, the kings' courts
refused to recognize equitable principles, rights, or remedies as they
came before the kings' courts, one by one. The result has been the
tearing in two of our unwritten law; the split between law and
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equity which so hampers the development of each, and which makes
it impossible, as long as it lasts, to build up a harmonious and sym-
metrical body of unwritten law.
The refusal to adopt new ideas or to receive other systems of law,
in whole or in part, is therefore fatal to any advance in the unwrit-
ten law. To insist that its existing principles are all-sufficient and
that its existing classifications are all-comprehensive is the charac-
teristic symptom of arrested development of any judicial system.
On the other hand, the law which is received must be incorporated
into the existing system. The general pn'*nrciple of the system which
grants the reception must be extended, even though in a modified
form, into the system of law which is received. To attempt to take
over a system of law without modifying it so as to secure at least a
comparative degree of harmony between the old and the new, results
in confusion and not in progress.
The doctrine of discharge of contract by supervening impossi-
bility of performance has had difficulties in youth and maturity in
getting a foothold in the English law. Misleading analogies, fol-
lowed by receptions of foreign legal principles, followed by other
misleading analogies, have so combined that while the doctrine of
impossibility is left alive, it is at times hard even for its friends to
recognize it. From an early period of the English law it has been
assumed that a contract which was personal in its nature" was dis-
charged by the death of the party from whom performance was due.'
This was probably the true rule of early English law. Indeed, if we go
back far enough, it is harder to find obligations that survive against
executors or heirs than it is to find obligations which die with the
person. The cases which are cited in support of this proposition,
however,2 go no farther than to say, in what appear to be obiter,
that a personal covenant dies with the person; and to raise the ques-
tion whether a covenant to pay quit-rent'and the like was a personal
covenant or not.
While no reference is made in these opinions to any principle of
Roman law, and while there does not seem to be any tendency in
these cases to receive the Roman law of voluntary extinction of
obligations, the principle thus laid down is essentially the same as
the principle of Roman law that obligations were extinguished by
3 Hyde v. Dean of Windsor, Cro. Eliz. 5,92 (citing 48 Ed. lII p1. 2, and Dyer ZU4 a.]
'Hyde v. Deaf% of Windsor, Cro. Eliz. S52 [citIng 48 Ed. III pL 2, and Dyer 1x4 a.]
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the death of the debtor or the creditor if the action were one which
was not hereditary.
A promise by a bailee to redeliver an animal which was bailed to
him to be redelivered on demand, was held to be discharged by the
death of the animal without the fault of the bailee before demand
was made by the bailor.3 While the result which was reached in
this case is substantially the same that would be reached by apply-
ing the Roman law doctrine of obligations de certo corpore, no ref-
erence is made in the opinion to this doctrine; and no tendency to
receive the Roman law on this subject appears from any of the
reports of the case. This was probably due more to a lack of famil-
iarity with the Roman law than to wealth of English authority on
this subject, since the leading authority cited in support of the
decision is the Old Testament., The lack of authority on this subject in English law is indicated,
not only by the reference to the Hebraic Code, but also by the fact
that the court decided the case in analogy to the law of carriers; and
held that the bailee was discharged because it had become impos-
sible by the act of God for him to perform his promise to redeliver
the animal.
It may be added, parenthetically, that the analogy which was
adopted in this case has been abandoned by most courts as part of
the law of impossibility of performance. 4  While in a number of
cases impossibility is caused by a so-called 'Act of God,' the idea of
impossibility and of the act of God are distinct. The notion of the
act of God was taken over from the law of common carriers, where,
for the purpose of avoiding the danger of fraud and collusion, the
courts required the carrier to show not only that loss or ihjury to
the goods was due to a cause beyond his own control, but also that
it was not due to any human,agency whatever.5  It is evident that
8 Williams v. Llnyd. W. Jones 70 [citing Exodu.q 22. io: Bracton lib. 2. f. 80- 40
E. Ill z.6; and also reported at greater length as Williams v. Hide, Palmer 548.]
'Taylor v. Caldwell, 3 Best. & S. 826; Ainsworth v. Ritl, 38 Cal. 89; Alexander v.
Dorsey, x2 Ga. rz. 56 Am. Dec. 443; Womack v. McQuarry, 28 Ind. 103, 92 Am. Dec.
306; Prather v. Latshaw, (Ind.) 122 N. E. 72x; Cox v. Chase. 95 Kan. 531, L. R. A.
1915-E, 590, 148 Pac. 766; Runyon v. Culver, 168 Ky. 45, L. R. A. x916-F, 3, xS S. W.
640; Stockwell v. Hunter, 52 Mass. (x Met.) 448, 45 Am. Dec. 220; Roberts v. Lynn
ice Co., 187 Mass. 402, 73 N. E. 523 (obiter); Graves v. Berdan, 26 N. Y. 498 [affirming,
Graves v. Berdan, 29 Barb. (N.Y.) 0oo]; Winton v. Cornish, 5 Ohio 477; Moving Pic-
ture Co. v. Scottsih & National Ifs. Co., 244 Pa. St. 358, 90 AUt. 642; C. & St. L. Ry. v.
Heikens, xx2 Tenn. 378, 6s L. R. A. 298, 79 S. W. 1038 (obiter); Arbens v. Exley, 52
W. Va. 476, 6x L. R. A. 957, 44 S. E. 149 (obiter).
5
Gulf Coast Transportation Co. v. Howell, 70 Fla. S44, L. P. A. zgx6-D, 974, 70
So. S67: (nbiter); Wald v. Pittsburgh, C., C.. & St. L. R. Co.. 162 111. 54.5. 53 Am. St.
Rep. 332, 35 L. R. A. 356, 44 N. E. 888; Shellabarger Elevator Co. v. Illinois Central
Railroad Cn.. 278 3I. 33, L. R. A. 191 p., IOx, xx6 N. E. i7o (obiter); Arnstrong v.
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a number of facts which cause impossibility in the proper sense of
the term may be the result of human agency. Indeed, in the subse-
quent development of the doctrine of impossibility the courts have
ignored the distinction between human agency and the act of God
wherever this distinction would have produced any legal conse-
quences. On the one hand impossibility, due to human agency, 
is
recognized ;8 while on the other hand the fact that performance is
Illinois Central Railroad Co., 26 Okla. 352, zg L. R. A. (N.S.) 671, 
o9 Pac. :2x6; St.
Louis & Santa Fe Railroad Co. v. Dreyfu.e, 42 Okla. 4n z, 141 Pac. 773, 
[.ub llomine St.
Louis & San Francisco Railroad Co. v. Dreyfus, L. R. A. ix.i-D, 547] 
(abiter).
6 Wiggins v. Ingleton, 2 Ld. Raym. :21; Melville v. DeWolfe, 4 El. 
& Bl. 844; The
Jack Park, 4 C. Rob. 308; Taylor v. Cardwell, 3 Best. & S. 826; Malcomson 
v. Wappoo
Mills, 88 Fed. 68o; Ainsworth v. Ritt, 38 Cal. 89; Alexander v. Dorsey, 
12 Ga. x2, s6 Am.
Dec. 443; Nally v. Nally, 74 Ga. 669, 58 Am. Rep. 458; Leopold v. Salkey, 89 Ill. 412, 3!
Am. Rep. 93; Chicago Edison Co. v. Huyett & Smith Mfg. Co, 66 111. App. 
222; Wdmack
v. McQuarry, 28 Ind. X03, 92 Am. Dec. 3o6; Carroll v. Bowersock, ioo 
Kan. 270, L. I. A.
1g9 7-D, oo6, 164 Pac. 143; Jinnings 
v. Amend, x Kan. 130, L.'R. A. 1917-F, 626, z65
PaC. 84.5; Read v. Frankfort Bank, 23 Me. ji
8 ; Stockwell v. Hunter, .52 Mas. (xi Met.)
448, 45 Am. Dec. 220; Roberts v. Lynn Ice Co., 187 Mass. 402, 
73 N. E. 5,23 (obiter);
Penas v. Cherveny, 135 Minn. 427, L. R. A. 19 17-E, 655, 
z6: N. W. 15O; Ganong v.
Brown, 88 Miss. 53, 117 Am. St. Rep. 731, 40 So. 556; Dame v. Wood, 
75 N. H. 38.
7o Ad. io8x; Graves v. Berdan, 26 N. Y. 498 [affirming, 
Graves v. Berdan, 29 Barb.
(N.Y.) zoo]; Dexter v. Norton, 47 N. Y. 62, 7 Am. Rep. 415; People 
v. Globe Mutual
Life Ins. Co., gi N. Y. 174: Lorillard v. Cl.de, 142 N. V. ,4r6. 24 L. 
R. A. 1.' 37 N. E.
489; Wilcox v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, x73 N. Y. 50, 93 Am. 
St. Rep. S79,
6S N. E. 857; Lahey v. Lahey, 174 N. Y. 146, 95 Am. St. Rep. 554, 61 L. R. 
A. 791,
66 N. E. 670: Winton v. Cornish. Ohio 477: Moving Picture Co. v. Scottish & 
National
Ins. Co., 244 Pa. St. 358, go Atl. 642; C. & St. L. Ry. v. Heikens, 112 Tenn. 378, 65
L. R. A. 298, 79 S. W. 1038 (obiter); Weis v. Devlin, 67 Tex. 5o7, 6o Am. Rep. 38,
3 S. W. 726; Arbens V. Exley, 52 W. Va. 476, 61 L. R. A. 
957, 44 S. E. 149 (obiter);
Griffath v. Blackwater Boom & Lumber Co., ss W. Va. 604, 69 L. R. A. 124, 48 S. E.
442 [for former opinion, see Griffith v. Lumber Co., 46 W. Va. 5
6 , 33 S. E. 125]; Boyd
v. Mutual Fire Association, z16 Wis. 155, 96 Am. St. Rep. 948, 6x L. R. A. 98, 
go N.
W. :o86, 94 N. W. 171; Halsey v. Waukesha Springs Sanitarium, 125 VWis. 3x1, r1o Am.
St. Rep. 838. 104 N. W. 94. A contract for personal services is discharged by the arrest
and imprisonment, or involuntary detention of the party by whom such services are to
be rendered. Melville v. DeWolfe, 4 El. & BE. 844; The Tack Park, 4 C. Rob. 3o8; 
Leo-
pold v. Salkey, 89 11. 412, 31 Am. Rep. 93; Jinnings v. Amend, 10x Nan. 13o, I. R. A.
917-F. 626, 165 Pac. 845. Such imprisonment or involuntary detention 
operates as im-
possibility and not bieach.. Hughes v. Womsutta Mills, 93 Mass. (xx AIL) 201; Kowalski
v. McAdoo, - N. 3. -, 107 AtL 477. Involuntary detention leaves the employee free to
recover the value of the services rendered by him up to the time of such imprisonment.
Hughes v. Wansutla Mills, 93 Mass. (: All.) 201. A contract for furnishing support
is discharged by the imprisonment or involuntary detention of the person to whom such
support is to be furnished. Penas v. Cherveny, 135 Minn. 427, L. R. A. 1917-E, 6SS, x6:
N. W. 1so. In some jurisdictions the dissolution of a corporation, at least if involuntary,
is held to discharge its executory contracts. Malcomson v. Wappoo Mills, 88 Fed. 68o:
Bifur v. Stand4rd Distilling & Distributing Co., 74 N. 3. Eq. 546, 70 Afl. 934; People V.
Globe Mutual Life Ins. Co., 91 N. Y. x74;'Lorlaerd v. Clyde, 142 N. Y. 456, 24 L. R.
A. 113, 37 N. E. 489; Griffith v. Blackwater Boom & Lumber Co., 55 W. Va. 604, 69 
L.
R. A. 121, 48 S. E. 442 [for former opinion, see Grifflth v. Lumber Co., 46 W. Va. 56, 33
S. E. 1251; Boyd v. Mutual Fire Association, 116 Wis. 155, 96 Am. St. Rep. 948, 6: L. R.
A. 9z8, go N. W. 1o86, 94 N. W. 17. See however, Spader v. Mural Decoration Mfg.
Co., 47 N. 3. Eq. 18, 2o At. 378.
The destruction 'of a specific subject-matter operates as a discharge on the theory
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"prevented by a so-called 'Act of God' is not of itself sufficient to show
that operative impossibility of performance exists.7
With the law in this formative state, (to return from a consid-
eration of the ultimate fate of the theory that impossibility was to
be explained as an 'Act of God,') and with little in the reported
decisions on the subject of impossibility, whatever the general un-
derstanding may have been, a case arose," which is not a true case
of impossibility at all, but which th- court decided as though the
question of impossibility were raised. The plaintiff declared
in debt on lease for years in which rent was reserved; and the de-
of impossibility, whether such destruction is due to an "act of God" or not. Taylor v.
Caldwell, 3 Best. & S. 826; Ainsworth v. Ritt 38 Cal. 89; Alexander v. Dorsey, 12 Ga.
z2, 56 Am. Dec. '443; Woonack v. McQuarry, 28 Ind. 103, 92 Am. Dec. 3o6; Romero v.
Newman. So La. Ann. 8o, 23 So. 493; Stockwell v. Hunter, s2 Mass. (ii Met.) 448,
4s Am. Dec. 22o; Roberts v. Lynn Ice Co., x87 Mass. 403, 73 N. E. 523 (obiter); Graves
v. Beidan, 26 N. Y. 498 [affirming, Groves v. Berdan, 29 Barb. (N. Y.) zoo],, Winton v.
Cornish, s Ohio 477; Moving Picture Co. v. Scottish & National Ins. Co., 24 Pa. St.
3s8. oo At. 642: C. & St. L. Rv. v. Heikenx, xx2 Tenn. 378. 6S L. R. A. 208. 79 S. W.
1038 (obiter); Arbenz v. Exley, 52 W. Va. 476, 6r L R. A. 957, 44 S. E. 149 (obiter).
In building contracts the distinction is not between the act of God and the act of
man. but between contractst for work and labor on the buildinz of another, and contracts
for the construction of a building. A contract for performing work and labor on the
building of another Is discharged by the destruction of the building without the fault of
either party, whether such destruction is due to a technical "act of God" or not. Schwarts
v. Sounders. 46 Ill. iS; Carroll v. Bowersock, oo Kan. 270, L. R. A. xgx 7-D, ioo6, 164
Pac. x43; Lord v. Wheeler, 67 Mass. (x Gray) 282; Ganong v. Brown, 88 Miss. 53, 117
Am. St. Rep. 731, 40 So. ss6; Dome v. Wood, 75 N. H. 38, 70 Atl. xo8.- A contract to
move a building is discharged by its destruction. Jones-Gray Construction Co. v. Steph-
ens, x67 Ky. 765, x8x S. W. 659; Angus v. Scully, 176 Mass. 357, 79 Am. St. Rep. 318,
49 L. R. A. 562, 57 N. E. 674. A contract for constructing a building may be broken by
its destructibn, but such contract is not discharged on any theory of impossibility. Com-
nercial Fire Ins. Co. v. Capital City Ins. Co., 8z Ala. 320, 60 Am. Rep. z62, 8 So. 222;
Cutcliff v. McAnally, 88 Ala. 507, 7 So. 331; Humbolt Lumber Mill Co. v. Crisp, 146 Cal.
686, xo6 Am. St. Rep. 75, 81 Pac. 30; School District v. Dauchy, 25 Conn. 53o, 68 Am.
Dec. 371; Doll v. Young, 149 Ky. 347, 149 S. W. 854; Milske v. Steiner Mantel Co., 103
Md. 235, xi1 Am. St. Rep. 354, 5 L. R. A. (H.S.) 0xo5, 63 Ad. 471; Adams v. Nichols,
36 Mass. (19 Pick) 275, 3 Am. Dec. 137; Trenton Public Schools v. Bdnnett, 27 N. 5.
L. 513, 72 Am. Dec. 373; Tompkins v. Dudley, 25 N. Y. 272, 82 Am. Dec. 349.
The theft of an insurance policy, Wilcox v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 173 AI.
Y. 50, 93 Am. St. Rep. 579, 65 N. E. 857, or the refusal of the beneficiary to return it.
Nally v. Nally, 74 Ga. 669, s8 Am. Rep. 458; Lahey v. .Lahey, 174 N. Y. 146, 95 Am. St.
Rep. 554, 6: L. R. A. 791, 66 N. E. 670, discharges a provision which requires its sur-
render as a means of changing the beneficiary. If the impossibility is in fact due to an
act of God, the contract is discharged. Krause v. Board of School Trusees, z62 Ind.
278, r92 Am. St. Rep. 203, 65 L. R. A. 111, 70 N. E. 264; Butterfield v. Byron, 153 Mass.
517, 25 Am. St. Rep. 654, 12 L. R. A. 571, 27 N. E. 667; Lovering v. Buck Mountain
Coal Co., S4 Pa. St. 29X. It is, however, the impossibility that is the operative fact, and
"sot the act of God, as such. Howell v. Couplaod, L. R. x Q. B. Div. 258.
SMeriwether v. Lowndes County, 89 Ala. 362, 7 So. 198; Prather v. Latshaw, (Ind.)
122 N. E. 72z; Cox *. Chose, 95 Kan. 531, L. R. A. 19 1s-E, 59o, x48 Pac. 766; Cater v.
Wilson,' X02 Kan. 2oo, x69 Pac. x139; Runyan v. Culver, z68 Ky. 4S, L. H. A. 1916-F, 3,
18x S. W. 640; Mitchell v. Weston, 9z Miss. 414, T. L. R. A. (N.S.) 833, 45 So. 571.
. Paradine v. Jane. Aleyn 26.
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fendant pleaded "that a certain German Prince, by name Prince
Rupert, an alien born, enemy to the King and Kingdom, had invaded
the Realm with a hostile army of men; and with the same force
did enter upon the Defendant's possession, and him expelled, and
held out of possession from 19 of July i8 Car. until the Feast of
the Annunciation, 2I Car., whereby he could not take the profits."
According to modem theories of impossibility, no question of im-
possibility was raised by this plea. The estate for which the lessee
had bargained had passed to him; and the fact that he could not
enjoy the possession thereof was not due to any act of the lessor,
or to eviction by superior title; but to the wrongful act of a third
person against whom he could have had adequate legal redress in
times of peace. As thus construed, the plea would not be regarded
as raising any question of impossibility at modem law. If the plea
might be regarded as a statement of the reasons which prevented
the lessee from having the money with which to pay the lessor, it
can only be said that neither our law nor the Roman law has ever
regarded the inability of the debtor to secure the means of payment
as impossibility. As far as it has any legal effect, it is breach and
not impossibility." In deciding this case, however, the court laid
down a rule which, when taken out of its context, sounds like a prin-
ciple of impossibility, saying: "When the party by his own contract
creates a duty or charge upon himself, he is bound to make it good,
if he may, and notwithstanding any accident by inevitable necessity,
because he might have provided against it by his contract." It is
largely owing t6 the statement just quoted that this case has assumed
an ex post facto importance in the law of impossibility, which it
does not deserve upon its own merits, because of the fact that so
many of the cases,1" as well as some of the text writers on English
law,1 have treated this as the leading case on-impossibility of per-
' McCreery v. Green, 38 Mich. i 7z; Lewis v. Atlas Mutual Life Ins. Co., 6z Mo. 534;
McConnell v. Hewes, so W. Va. 33, 40 S. E. 436.
U Paradine v. Jane is quoted in the note to Walton v. Waterhouse, a Wins. Saunders
420, as a case of impossibility; and the influence of the learned annotator has led subse-
quent writers and courts to assume that it is a case of impossibility. See Hall v.
Wright, El. 11. & El. 746; E. A. Tdmphn Steamship Co. v. Anglo-Mexican Petroleum
Products Co., [igi6] 2 A. C. 397; Leiston Gas Co. v. Leiston-cum-Sizewell Urban District
Council, [1916] 2 K. B. 428; Chinese Mining & Engineering Co. v. Sale, (1917] 2 K. B.
599.
In See ANso on CONTRAS [Huffcut's FA., 29o6] pp. 396 and 397.
In PoLLOCo cO Ts 8th Ed., pp. 432 et seq.] Paradine v. Jane is recognized
as a case which is not one of true impossibility. In the first edition of LEAKZ ON COK-
rsACTs, p. 362, Paradine v. Jane was treated as a case of impossibility on account of the
note to Walton v. Waterhouse. In the second edition, p. 693, Paradine v. Jane is quoted
and this quotation is repeated in the third edition p. 598. In the subsequent editions,
the reference to this case disappears.
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formance and have regarded the rule already quoted as the' state-
ment of the early common law doctrine of impossibility of perform-
ance. The fact that the case is not one in which the question of
impossibility is- raised, and the fact that the result which the court
actually reached would have been reached in jurisdictions in which
the laxest possible view of impossibility. was taken, seems to have
been. little known and less regarded.
Whether but few cases of impossibility arose during the years
that followed the decision in Paradine v. Jane, or whether the stren-
uous obiter in this case discouraged litigation, the fact remains that
there is little in English law on the question of impossibility from
the twenty-third year of the reign of Charles II tothe twenty-sixth
year of the reign of Victoria. Equity had indicated a willingness
to give relief in cases of impossibility in which the law court gave
no remedy."
Under a contract to use a vessel in the East India trade for a period
of about a year, which contained a provision that compensation was
to be paid d certain length of time after the vessel returned to Eng-
land, equity granted relief where, by the mutual assent of the par-
ties, the vessel was used for a period of three years and, by reason
of such use, it became unfit for a return voyage to England, so that
the condition upon which the payment wat due could not be per-
formed.13 While an embargo laid by the British government was
held to discharge a contract by which an English subject had char-
tered a vessel from an alien owner, the performance of which con-
tract was prevented by the embargo,1
4 the act of a foreign govern-
ment in imposing a hostile embargo,
1 5 or in prohibiting the expor-
tation of articles which one party had agreed to export from such
country,"" was held not to operate as a discharge. In like manner
a covenant to send a cargo alongside at a foreign port was held not
to be discharged by the fact that, on account of a pestilence, inter-
course was forbidden at such port and the performance of such
contract was thus prevented by the act of such foreign government."'
This latter group of cases, it may be added, was frequently used
as authority for the general proposition that the English law did
not recognize the doctrine of impossibility of performance except
in special cases; while it is really authority for the far narrower,
. v. w .Est Irdia Co., 2 Vern. 2o.
"Edwin v. East India CO., 2 Vern. 210.
14 Touteng ,v. Hubbard, 3 Bos. & Pul. _-9x.
5 Forster v. Christie, xs East 2o5.
16 Blight [Bright] v. Page, 3 Bos. & Pul. 295, note a.
IT Barker v. Hodgson, 3 Maule & S. 267.
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though probably nonwise, rule that the English law does not recog-
nize the act of a foreign government as creating an impossibility
which will operate as a discharge of a contract which is made in
England, especially if such contract is eventually to be performed
in England.18
The risk of loss of chattels by fire was held to be that of the
owner of the chattels, whether the seller or the buyer;19 the court
bssuming in this case, rather than actually deciding, that the de-
struction of specific chattels after title had passed, and before de-
livery, would discharge the seller. Serious physical disability was
held to discharge a contract to intermarry at the ele'ction of the ad-
versary party ;2 but, by a closely divided court, it was held that the
party who suffered from such physical disability could not take
advantage of it to avoid such contract if the adversary party was
willing to perform.
In this condition of English law, the owner of a music hall for
a valuable consideration agreed to allow it to be used for the pur-
pose of giving certain concerts. After the contract was made, and
before the first concert was to be given, the music hall was destroyed
by fire. In an action against the owner of the music hall to recover
damages for breach of such contract, it was held that performance
would be discharged where, from the nature of the contract, it was
apparent that the parties contracted on the basis of the continued
existence of a specific person or thing.22 In reaching this result the
court conceded that there was "no doubt that where there is a posi-
tive contract to do a thing not in itself unlawful, the contractor must
perform it or pay damages for not doing it, although, in consequence
of unforeseen accidents, the performance of his contract has become
unexpectedly burthensome or even impossible." This concession is
made in reliance on some early authorities, which seem to fall far
short of establishing such rule,2 3 and the court does not cite Para-
dine v. Jane, although this was apparently the case which was relied
on chiefly by the attorney for the plaintiff.
The court was aided in reaching this result by a consideration of
the texts of the Roman law on the subject of the obligatio de certo
corpore, although the court declared expressly that the civil law was
I' See Jacobs v. Cridit Lyonna, 12 Q. B. Div. 589.
Is Rugg v. Minelt, xx East xo.
'Atchisoon v. Baker, 2 Peake's N. P. C. x, 103.
m Hall v. Wright, El.. BI. & El. 746.
2 Taylor v. Caldwell, 3 Best & S. 826.
= These cases involved the effect of impossibility on conditions rather than on cove-
nants. x ROLLE ABV. 450, Condition G, pl. xo; Walton v. Waterhouse, 2 Wins. Sa'und.
421 a [6th Ed.]; Hall v. Wright, El. Bl. & El. 746.
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not of itself authority in an English court, but that it affordedgreat
assistance in investigating the principles on which the law was
grounded. The court quoted from the Digest: "If a promise has
been made to deliver the slave Stichus on a certain day, and he dies
before that day, the promisor is not bound."
24
The Roman law principle of the discharge of obligations de certo
corpore, which was thus introduced into the English law, has been
repeated with variations by English courts,25 and, as far as repeti-
tion can make it, it is now. an established principle of the English
law.Y
2
In deciding this case, it would seem that the court had sufficient
English authority on the subject of impossibility of performance to
justify it in reaching the conclusion which it reached; and it might
well have stopped after fortifying itself by a consideration of the
texts of the Roman law, which showed that that system of law had
reached substantially the same result as the English law, and for
substantially the same reasons. Unfortunately, however, the court,
after reaching the conclusion that the destruction of the music hall
rendered the contract impossible of performance, and this operated
as a discharge, sought to find another justification of this result in
the doctrine of the implied condition. The continued existence of
the contractor, or of the specific thing, was said to be a term of the
contract and to amount to an implied condition. The death of the
contractor, or the destruction of the thing, was therefore regarded
as operating as a discharge of the contract in accordance with the
intention of the parties as deduced from the language of the con-
tract and from the surrounding circumstances.
28
In cases of this sort, the analogy of the implied condition is evi-
DIGES', lib. XLV, tit. x, 1. 33. The amplification of this doctrine in Dxo. lib. XLV,
tit. 1, L 23 is also quoted, in which such destruction is treated as the performance of a
condition. Pothier's discussion of the rights and liabilities of the debtor corporis certi in
POTHXEa ON OOBLIGATIOS. Part III, ch. 6, art. 3. § 668 is also cited. The court might
also have .quoted, although it did not do so, "If anyone has promised to give a secular
thing (profanam; that IS a thing which has not been devoted to the gods), or the slave
Stichus, he is discharged if without any act on the part of the promisor the thing becomes
consecrated (sacra; that is, devoted to the Dils supcris), or if Stichus becomes free; and
these things are not subject to the obligation if at a later time, through some law, the
thing whibh was devoted to the gods becomes secular, or Stichus is reduced from freedom
to slavery." DIGEST, lib. XLV., tit. I, 1. 33. See also DIG. lib. XLV., Ut. , 1. 91.
Krell v. Henr. Eigo." z K. B. 740.
5
Nickoll v. Ashton, Exgoil a K. B. x26: Horiock v. Bea, tigi6l I A. C. 486
[reversing (rpis) 3 K. B. 627].
"The principle seems to be that, in contracts in .which the performance depends
on the continued existence of a given person or thing, a condition is implied that the
impossibility of performance arising from the perishing of the person or thing shall
excuse the performance." Tavlor v. Caldwell. 3 Best & S. 826. 839.
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dently a fiction which is at best unnecessary and at worst mislead-
ing. If the contract shows that the parties contemplated the death
of the person or the destruction of the thing, or any other act which
prevented performance, and if they provided for the consequences
of such event in the contract, either in express terms or by fair
implication, the doctrine of impossibility of performance has no
application.2 9  If the contract is not otherwise in violation of 
the
i ules of positive law, the only function of the court in cases of this
sort is to ascertain the intention of the parties and to give effect
thereto. These are true cases of c-nditions, either expressed or
implied. Impossibility of performance exists only where there has
been an unconditional promise to do a thing, and performance of
such promise has been rendered impossible by some subsequent act
or event which the parties had not anticipated.
Unfortunately, the theory of the implied condition, which was
suggested in this case, has been adopted as a convenient explana-
tion of the result which is actually reached in determination,
whether the act or event in question amounts to impossibility or
not.l In these cases, however, the court is obliged to ascertain, in
B= EIiolt v. Crutchley, [x926] A. C. 7; Berg v. Erickson, 234 Fed. 817, L. 
R. A-
xi1-A. 648: Warren v. Wagner, 7j Ala. x88. i Am. Rep. 446; 
Meriwether v. Loumdes
County, 89 Ala. 362, 7 So. 198; Polack v. Pioche, 35 Cal. 4x6, 95 Am. Dec. 
1Ss; School
District No. I v. Deuchy, 25 Conn. 53o, 68 Am. Dec. 371; Prather v. 
Latshaw, (InLd.)
122 N.'E. 7a; In re McIntosh, 1Sa Ia. 23, 1.9 N. W. 223; Cox v. Chase, 9s Kan. 332,
L. R. A. z .E 590, 148 Pac. 76.4; Runsan v. Culver. x68 Ky. 4.. L. R. A. 
z9x6-F. 3,
xaz S. W. 640; Van Wormer v. Crane, si Mich. 363, 47 Am. Rep. 58a, 
x6 N. W. 686;
Abby v. Billups, 3S Miss. 618, 72 Am. Dec. 143; Mitchell v. WeSton, 91 
Miss. 414, IS L
R. A. (N.S.) 833, 45 So. 572; Beach v. CrMn, 2 N. Y. 86, 49 Am. Dec. 
369; Cameron-
Hawt Realty Co. v. Albany, 207 N. Y. 377, 49 L. R. A. (N.S.) 922, 
2o N. E. 162;
Hoy v. Holt, 91 Pa. St. 88, 36 Am. Rep. 659; Miller v. Morris, 
SS TeX. 4z2, 40 Am.
Rep. 814; Ross v. Overton, 7 Va. (3 Call.) 309, 2 Am. Dec. 552.
The fact that an unqualified promise is made by one who is presumed 
to foresee
the possibility of the event which is claimed to make performance 
impossible, and that
he makes no provision therefor, is held to show an intention on his 
part to assume such
risk. Prather v. Latshaw, (Ind.) 22 N. E. 721; Cox v. Chase, 9S 
Kan. 532, L R. A.
1915-E, 590, 148.Pac. 766; Carter v. Wilson, 102 Kan. 200, 269 Pac. 
1139; Runyon V.
Culver, x68 Ky. 45, L. R. A. 19i6-F, 3, 181 S. W. 640.
NHoroct v. Beal, ri9z61 I A. C. 486: F. A. Tamiplin Steamship Co. v. Anglo-
Mexican Petroleum Products Co.. li9261 a A. C. 397: Nickoll v. Ashton, 119011 
2 K.
B. 26; Appleby v. Myers, L. R. 2 C. P. 65r; Howell v. Coupland, 
L. R. I Q. B. Div.
2.8: Robinson v. Davison, L. R. 6 EX. 269: Reed v. United States. 78 
U. S. (z Wall.)
591. 2o L. ed. 2ao: Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry-. v. Hovt. z49 U. S. 
1. 37 1. ed.
625; Greil Bros. Co. v. Mabsnn, 179 Ala. 444. A3 L. R. A. (N.S.) 664, 6o So. 
876: Levy
v. Caledonian I. Co., 256 Cal. 527, 205 Pa. 598; Krause v. Board 
of Trustees, 162
Ind. 278, zo Am. St. Rep. 2o3. 6.r _ L. A. 111. 70 W. E. 264: American Mercantile
Exchange v. Blunt. 202 Me. 128. 12o Am. St. Rep. 
A6.;. 2o L. I. A. (N.S.) 414, 2n Am.
& Eng. Ann. Cas. 1022. 66 Atl. 222: Hooper v. Mueller, 2s8 Mich. 
s9. 233 An. St.
Rep. 390. 123 N. W. 24; Dow v. Sleepy Eye State 
Bank, 88 Minn. ... 9.3 N. W ral$2
Holloran v. Schmidt Brewing Co.. 137 Minn. 241. L. R. A. x927-E. 
777. x62 N. W. o82;
Dexter v. Morton, 47 N. Y. 62. 7 Am. Rep. A2.5: Stewart v. 
Stone. 127 N. Y. 50, 34
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the first instance, whether the act or event amounts to an impossi-
bility which discharges the contract before it is able to determine
whether it is an implied condition or not. If the case is found to
be one of impossibility, the fiction of the implied condition is then
invoked to explain the result; while if the case is found not to be
one of impossibility, it is said that the implied condition does not
exist. The very couirts that inVoke the doctrine of the implied con-
dition as a justification for treating the contract as discharged insist
that it is impossible to imply further conditions for mutual resti-
tution in case of supervening impossibility if the law does not rec-
ognize quasi-contractual rights arising out of such discharge.31 In
other words, the condition is implied to the extent to which the law
treats impossibility as a discharge, and no farther.
Little harm would be done by the use of this unnecessary fiction
if it Were not for the fact that the courts are occasionally led to
talk, and possibly to reason, as if impossibility of performance
were a question of the actual intention of the parties, instead of
operating only when the parties had no intention as to the effect
of the combination of facts which has arisen after the contract was
made, and which prevents performance.
III
At the outbreak of the War in 191432 the Anglo-American law
had therefore recognized at least three well settled classes of super-
vening impossibility of performance: impossibility due to the de-
struction of the subject-matter where the contract called for a spe-
cific subject-matter as distinguished from a general subject-matter ;38
L. R. A. 2z.. 28 N. E. sos: Dolan v. Rodgers. 140 N. Y. 489. 44 N. E. 167: Buffalo &
Lancaster Land Co. v. Bellevue Land & Intrvement Co., 16.r X. Y. 247. sr L. ,. A.
9si.. 9 N. E. 5: Comeron-Hawn Realty Co. v. Albany. 2o7 N. Y. 377 49 L. R. A. (N.S.)
9a. zoz N. E. x62: Parker v. Macomber. 17 . . 674. z6 L. R. A. 88. 24 AtL 464:
HerS "v East Tennesxee Breving Co.. 121 Tenn. 6g. x.o Am. St. Rep. 7.5.4. x L. I A.
(N.S.) 964. zxa S. W. ;64: Virglinia Iron. Coal & Coke Co. v. Grahani, (Va.) 98 S. E.
659; The Stratford v. Seattle Brewing & Malting Co.. 94 Wash. 12. L. T. A. 19g7-C,
931. x6a Pac. 31. 1
R "It is impossible to import a condition into a contract which the parties could
have imported and have not done so." Civil Service Co-operative Society v. General
Steam Navigation Co.. [19031 2 K. B. 7.56.
32Cases arising after 1914, decided in accordance with the general principles then
Wli do~vn, will not be omitted.
= Taylor v. Caldwell, 3 Best & S. 826; Howell v. C.upland, L. R. x Q. B. Div. -58;
Baily v. De Crespigny, L. P. 4 Q. B. Cases, izo; Angle-Egyptian Navigation Co. IV,
Rennle, L. R. 1o C. P. 271; Nickoll v. Ashton, [19oi z K. B. x26; Arlington Hotel Co.
v. Rector. 124 Ark. go. x86 S. W. 62=: Ainsworth v. Ritt, 8 Cal. 89; Ontario Deciduous
Fruit Grower.? Association v. Cutting Fruit Packing Co.. 134 Cal. 21. 86 Am. St. Rep.
23!. ..3 L. R. A. 68z. 66 Pac. 28: Alexander v. Dorsey. 12 Ga. X2. .6 Am. Dec. 443;
Nally v. Nally, 74 Ga, 669, 58 Am. Rep. 458; Schwartz v. Saunders, 46 M11. 18; Walker
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impossibility due to the death of one of the parties to the contract
where the contract was one which provided for personal perform-
ance ;34 and impossibility caused by a subsequent change of law,
v. Tucker, 7n Ill. .27; Siegel v. Eaton & Prince Co.. x65 Ill. 55o, 46 N. E. 449; Chicago
Edison Co. v. Hayett & Smith Mfg. Co.. 66 I1. App. 222; Womack v. McQuarry, 28
Ind. :oa. 92 Am. Dec. 3o6: Krause v. Board of School Trustees, T62 Ind. 278. 1n2 Am.
St. Rep. 203. 65 L. R. A. iir. 7n N. E. 264: WelLs v. Sutphin, 64 Kan. 87.3. 68 Pac. 648:
,Carroll v. Bower.sock. 10o Kan 27o. L. R. A. 17-D. roo6. x64 Pac. 143: Joner-Gray
Constructinn Co. v. Stephens. x67 Ky. 76 5 181 S. W. 6ng; Romero v. Newman, go La.
Ann. 80. 2.3 So. A9-3; Knight v. Bean, 2 2 Me. 531; Pinkh m v. Libby, 93 Me. 575, 49 L.
R. A. 69.. 4.q Ad!. 823: Stockwell v. Hunter, sz Mas.. (xi Met.) 448. 4.5 Am. Dec. 220;
Lord v. Wheeler. 67 Ma.s. (z Gray) 282; Eliot National Bank v, Beol, 141 Mass. 566,
6 N. E. 742: Gilbert & Barker Affg. Co. v. Butler. 146 Mass. 82. is N. E. 76; Butter-
field v. B.ron, 1.3 Mass. 517. 2q Am. St. Rev. 654. 12 L. R. A. 571. z7 N. E. 667:
Angus v. Scully. 176 Mass. 357. 7o Am. St. Rep. ;18. 49 L. R. A. 562. q7 N. E. 674;
Roberts v. Lvnn Ice Co.. 187 MasR. 402. 73 N. E. .5a.: Browne v. Fairhall, 213 Mass.
290, 4s L. R. A. (N.S.) 349. ion N. E. 5s6: Ganong v. Brown, 88 Miss. 53. 117 Am.
St. Rep. 7.31. 40 So. s.6: Dame v. Wood. 7.5 N. H. 38. 70 At!. zo8:: Perlee v. .effcott,
89 N. 3. L. 34, 97 A1. 789; Graves v. Berdan, 26 N. Y. 498 Eaffirming Graves v. Berdan,
29 Barb.. QN.Y.) xool; Dexter v. arton, 47 N. Y. 6a. 7 Am. Rep. 4z5: Stewart v.
Stone, 127 N. Y. .oo. 14 L. R. A. 2zs. 28 N. E. 595: Wilcox v. Eouitable Life Asur,
once Society, i73 N. Y. 50, 93 Am. St. Rep. 579, 65 N. E. 857; Lahey v. Lahey, z74 N.
Y. 146. gs Am. St. Rep. ss4. 6: L. R. A. 791. 66 N. E. 67o Pasauntauk & North Rivet
Steamboat Co. v. Eastern Carolina Transportation Co., z66 N. Car. s8S. 82 S. E. 926;
Winton v. Cornish, S Oho 477: Board of Education v. Townsend, 63 0. S.514. .;2 L.
R. A. 868. SO N. E. 223: Powell v. Dayton, Sheridan & Grande Ronde Rv Co., 12
Or. 488: Lovering v. Buck Mountain Coal Cq., q4 Pa. St. .o:: Moving Picture Co. v.
Scottish & National Yns. Co.. 244 Pa. St. 358. 0o At. 642: Yerrington v. Greene, 7 R. L
589. 84 Am. Dec. 578: C. & St. L. Rv. v. Heikens, 1x2 Tenn. 378. 65 L. R. A. 2o8. 79
S. W. 1038: Weis v. Devlin. 67 Tex. 507. 6o Am. Rep. 38. 3 S. W. 726: Tatro v.
Bailey. 67 Vt. 73. 3o At!. 68s. R. .. Menx Lumber Co. v. McNeeley. 58 Wash. 223,
28 L. R. A. (N.S.) nOo7. :o8 Pac. 62:: Arbens v. Exlev. 52 W. Va. 476. 6: L. R. A.
957, 44 S. E. 149: Halsev v. Woukeha Springs Sanitarium, 125 Wis. 311. UzO Am. St.
Rep. 838. 10o N. W. 04.
3t Hyde v. Dean nf Windsor. Cro. Eliz. .5.: Sibni v. Kirkman, i M. & W. 418:
Hovey v. Blakeman. 4 Ves. Jr. .56; Tn re Overweg. lignol i Ch. 2ng: Howe Sewing
Machine Co. v. Rosensteel, 24 Fed. 583: Herren v. Harris, (Ala.) 78 So. 92:: Leah v.
Chenev. o Conn. 6zi. L. R. A. 1917-D. 80g. 98 At!. :32: Campbell v. Faxon. 73 Kan.
675. s L. R. A. (N.S.) 1002. 85 Pac. 760; Lapleau v. Successinn of Lapleau. :" La.
988, 8z So. 597; Marvel v. Phillips, z62 Mass. 399, 44 Am. St. Rep. 370, 26 L. R. A.
4x6. 38 N. E. 1z1: Mills v. Smith, z93 Mass. ix. 6 L. R. A. (N.S.) 865. 78 N. E. 765;
Browne v. Fairhall, 213 Mass. 290, 45 L. R. A. (N.S.) -349, oo N. E. 556; Adriance
v. Rutherford, 57 Mich. 170, 23 N. W. 718; Clifton v. Clark, 83 Miss. 446, xo2 Am.
St. Rep. 458, 36 So. 25x; Homan v. Redick, 97 Neb. 299, L. R. A. :g:s-C, 60, 149 N.
W. 782. Spalding v. Rosa. 71 N. Y. 40. 27 Am. Rep. 7: Sargent v. McLeod, 2oo N, r.
360. .a L. R. A. (N.S.)i 380. :03 N. E. :64: Siler v. Gra.. 86 N. Car. 66: McDonald
v. Black. 2o Ohio :8.. .s Am. Dec. 448; Parker v. Afacnmber, 17 R. T. 674. z6 L. R. A.
8.58. 24 At!. 464: Mendenhall v. Davir, Sa Wash. :69. 21 L. R. A. (N.S.) 914. 100 Psc.
336.
The destruction of a general subject-matter. such as a building to be constructe4
by a contractor, did not operate as a discharge. Commercial Fire Ir. Co. v. Capital
City Ins. Co.. 8z Ala. 320. 60 Am. Rep. 162, 8 So. 222: Cutcliff v. McAnalvi, 88 Ala.
5o7. 7 So. 3.31: Humboldt Lumber Mill Co. v. Crisp, 146 Cal. 686. :o6 Am. St. Rep. 75.
8: Pac. 3o: School Dijsrict v. Dauch.. 2. Conn. 530. 68 Am. Dec. 37:: Doll v. Young,
r49 Ky. 347. z4o S. W. 854; Milke v. Steiner Mantel Co., :03 Md. 21.. :15 Am. St.
Rep. 354. S L. R. A. (N.S.) zo. 6. At. 471: Adams v. Nichols. 36 Mass. (ig Pick.)
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or by the subsequent act of the state by whose law such contract
was governed 8  Whether these classes were exhaustive was an-
7.S. 3 Am. Dec. x.7: Trenton Public Schools v. Bennett, 27 N. J. L. srs. 72 Am. Dec.
373; Tompkins v. Dudley, as N. Y. 272, 82 Am. Dec. 349; Voght v. Hecker, io8 Wis.
306, 9S N. W. 90. A contract of agency which did not create a so-called 'power coupled
with an interest' is discharged by the death of either party thereto. In re Overweg, [9oz]
I Ch. 2og: Hovey v. Blakeman. 4 Ves. Jr. .56: Howe Sewing Machine Co. v. Rosen-
steel. 24 Fed. s8i: MilL, v. Smith, 193 Ma.s ix. 6 L. R. A. (N.S.) 865. 78 N. E. 76S;
Adriance v. Rutherford. 57 Mich. 31o. 23 N. W. 7z8: Hnnsos v. Redick. 97 Web. 299,
L. R. A. oxgg-C, 6ox. 149 N. W. 782: McDonnld v. Black. 2o Ohio IS. 54 Am. Dec. 448.
A contract which provides for the performance of services of a personal nature is
discharged by the death of the party who is to perform such services. Stubbs v. Holy.
Well Ry. Co., L. R. 2 Exch. 3*x: Cooke v. ColeCraft. 2 W. BL 8S6: Herren v. Harris,
(Ala.) 78 So. 921: Leahv v. Chene.y, oo Conn. 61x. L. IL A. x91-D. 80g. o8 Atd. x3=;
Lapleau v. Succession of Lapleau. f44 La. 988. 81 So. 597; Marvel v. Phillips. x62 Mass.
399, 44 Am. St. Rep. 370. 26 L. R.'A. 46, 38 N. E. 1117; Browne v. Fairhall, 213 Mass.
29o, s L. R. A. (H.S.) .tg. ion N. E. sS6: Clifton v. Clark, 81 Miss. 446. xo Am. St.
Rep. 458, 36 So. aS1; Sargent v. McLeod, 209 N. Y. 360, S r. R. A. (N.S.) 380, 103 N. E.
x64; Blakely v. Sousa, 197 Pa. St. 305, 80 Am. St. Rep. 821, 47 Ad. 286; and also by the
death of the party for whom such services are to be performed. Krumdick v. White, 92
Cal. 043, 28 Pac. 219; Homan v. Redick, 97 Neb. 299, L. R. A. 19x5-C, 6o, 049 N. W.
782; Lacy v. Getman, 009 N. Y. og, 16 Am. St. Rep. 806, 6 L. R. A. 728, 23 N. E. 452.
Among contracts of this sort are contracts by one to support another; Glidden v.
Korter, o Me. 269. ;8 AtL xSg: Parker v. Xfacomber. x7 R. 1. 674. z6 L. R. A. 8S8,
24 At]. 464; contracts for rendering professional services, such as attorney, Whitehead
v. Lord, 7 Exch. 69z: M yle v. Lander.. 78 Cal. 90. X2 Am. St. Rep. 22. an Pa. 241;
Turnan Y. Temke, 84 Ill. 286: Cleug v. Baumberger, x0o Ind. 536. 9 N. E. 70o: Clayton
v. Uerrett, S2 MIss. 353; Clifton v. Clark, 83 Miss. 446, 10 Am. St. Rep. 458, 36 So.
2s50 Sargent v. McLeod. 2n9 N. Y. 360. g2 L. R. A. (N.S.) 38o. 0o3 N. E. 164: or
consulting engineer; Stubbs v. Hol.ywell Ry. Co., L. R. 2 Exch. $It; contracts for acting
as manager; Herren v. Harris, (Ala.) 78 SO. 920; Campbell v. Faxon, 73 Kan. 675, S
L. R. A. (N.S.) 1002. 84 Pac. 760: Marvel v. Phillips, 162 Mas. 39g. 44 Am. St. Rep.
370, 26 L. R. A. 46, 38 N. E. 1117; Blakely v. Sousa, 197 Pa. St. 305, 80 Am. St.
Rep. 821. 47 AtL 286: contracts to make certain pavments out of earnings in a profes-
sional employment: Laplean v. Succession of Laplean, z44 La. 988, 81 So. 597; and
contracts to, render personal services as a servant. Leaky v. Cheney, qo Conn. 6xi.
L. R. A. 1g1-D. 8og. o8 Atl. 032. A contract in which the personal credit of one of
the parties is material, is discharged by the death of such party before be has given the
note which, by the contract, be is required to give. Browne v. Fairhall, 213 Mass. 29o,
4S L. R. A. (M.S.) 349. too N. E. 456. An executory contract to form a partnership
is discharged by the death of one of the parties. Dow v. State Bank. 88 Minn. 355,
93 N. W, 12X. Whether the death of one of the parties to a joint contract for per-
sonal services operated as a discharge of the entire contract, is a question upon which
there has been a conflict of authority. See on this question Griggs v. Swift, 82 Ga. 392,
14 Am. St. Rep. 176. s L- R. A. 40. 9 S. E. io62: Martin v. Hunt, 83 Mass. (x All.)
4z8; Hughes v. Gross, x66 Mass. 61. .g Am. St. Rep. 375. a2 L. R. A. 620, 41 'N. E.
1031: Clifton v. Clark, 83 Miiq. 446. io Am. St. Rep. 458. .6 So. 250.
35 Ottawa v. Ottawa Electric Rv. Co., I Ont. Law Rep. .77: Louisvilre & Nashville
Ry. v. Mottley. 2i9 U. S. 467. 55 . ed. 297. A4 L. R. A. (M.S.) 671 [reversing. Louis-
ville & Nashville Ry. v. Mottley, x33 Ky. 6.z, 118 S. W. 98z; Malconson v. Wappoo
Mils, 88 Fed. 68o; Fresno Milling Co. v. Fresno Canal & Irrigation Co., 126 Cal. 64o.
59 Pic. 0o: Macon & Birminghanm R.. Co. v. Gibson, 84 Ga. x. 20 Am. St. Rep. 1SS.
It S. E. 442: Jamieson v. -Indiana Natural Gas & Oil Co.. 128 Ind. SSS. 12 L. R. A.
65. 28 N. E. 76: Baltimore & Ohio Ry. v. Miller, 083 Ind. 323. 07 N. E. S4.: Howell
v. Hough, ,6 Ran. Iso. .6 Pac. 436: Dale v. Commonwealth, ioz Ky. 6x2. 38 L. R. A.
8o8. 42 S. W. 9n; Louisville & Nashville Ry. v, Crooe. x%6 Ky. 27. 4o L. R. A. (N.S.)
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other question. There was a strong feeling that there might be
other classes of impossibility outside of these three classes
3
As a justification for holding contracts of these classes, and pos-
sibly of other classes, discharged 'by supervening impossibility, the
courts were able to invoke the doctrine of impossibility at common
law and also the doctrine of impossibility at Roman law which had
been received to some extent into the common law. They were also
able to justify such holding in some cases by invoking the theory
of the act of God; and they were able to justify it in all cases by
the doctrine of implied conditions.
Another doctrine had, however, been growing up, and as the
cases arising out of the War of 1914 were presented for decision
the English courts, while invoking the older reasons for holding
certaih types of contract discharged, unfortunately turned to this
new doctrine as another analogy which they might use in develop-
848. x6n S. W. 759: Campbell v. Gullo. 142 La. zo82. L. . A. igi8-D. 251. 78 So. 124;
American Mercantile Exchange v. Blunt. 102 Me. z28. 12o Am. St. Rep. 463. io L. R. A.
(N. S.) 4z4. 66 At. 2X2: Standard Brewing Co. v. Well. 129 Md. 487. L. R. A. xgx7-C.
929. 99 Ad. 661: Kares v. Covell, i8o Mass. 2o6. ox Am. St. Rep. 271. 62 N. E. 244;
Hughsan v. Winthrop Sleambnat Ca., x81 Mass. sss. 8 L. R. A. 4a.2. 6 N. E. 74;
Hooper v. Mueller, is8 Mich. 593, 123 N. W. 24; Burns v. Koochfching, 68 Minn. 239,
71 N. W. 26: Halloran v. Schmidt Brewing Co., 137 Minn. 141. L. R. A. 1917-E. 777.
162 N. W. zo82: Brown v. Dillahuntv, x2 Miss. (4 Sm. & M.) 713. 43 Am. Dec. 499;
School District v. Howard, (Neb.) o8 N. W. 666: Rosenbaum v. Credit Svstem Co., 6x
N. J. L. 543, 40 Atl. 591; Buffalo East Side Ry. Co. v. Buffalo Street Railway Co., iix
N. Y. 132, 2 L. R. A. 384, 19 N. E. 63; Pennsylvania Co. v. Philadelphia Contribution-
Ship, 201 Pa. St. 497. 57 L. R. A. so. s2 At. isz: Burkhardt v. School Township,
9 S. D. 3s. 69 N. W. 16: Heart v. East Tennessee Briwing Co., 12x Tenn. 6o. :3o Am.
St. Rep. 753. 19 L. R. A. (N.S.) a64. 113 S. W. 364; Hotston Ice & Brewing Co. v.
Keenan, gg Tex. 79. 88 S. W. 107: Cowlev v. Northern Pacific Rv.. 68 Wash. 58. 41
L. P. A. (N.S.) S59, 123 Pac. 998; The Stratford v. Seattle Brewing & Molting Co.,
94 Wash. 12.. L. R. A. 19 17 -C. 932. 162 Pac. 31: Knen v. Fairmont Brewing Co., 
69 W.
Va. 94. 70 S. E. iog8. A contract which provides for issuing railway passes in the
future is discharged by subsequent legislation or constitutional provisions which forbid
the issuing of passes. Louisville & Nashville Rv. v. Mottley, 229 U. S. 467. n.r L. ed.
297. .14 L. IL A. (NS.) 671 [reversing. Louiille & Nashvtille Rv. v. Mottley, 133 Ky.
6.2, zz8 S. W. 9821: i.,ouitville & Narh ile y. v. Crowe. x.6 Ky. 27:9 L. P. A. (N.S.)
848, x6o S. W. 759; Cowley v. Northern Pacific Ry., 68 Wash. 5.8. 4X L. R. A. (N.S.)
559, 123 Pac. 998. A lease of property which is to be used for saloon purposes ex-
clusively or primarily, is discharged by legislation or constitutional provisions, enacted
thereafter, which forbid the use of such realty for such purpose. Greil Bros Co. v.
Mfobson, 179 Ala. 444, 43 L. R.. A. (N.S.) 664, 60 So. 876; Kahn v. Wilhelm, 128 Ark
239. x77 S. W. 403: Halloran v. Schmidt Brewing Co., 137 Minn. IA:. L. P. A. I17-E.
771. z62 N. W. 1082: Heart v. East Tennessee'Brewing Co., 122 Tenn. 69. 230 Am. St.
Rep. 753. z9 L. R. A. (N.S.) 964. 113 S. W. 36t: The Stratford v. Seattle Brewing &
Molting Co.. 94 Wash. x2.5. L. P.. A. 19 17-C, 931. 162 Pac. 31: Koets v. Fairmont Brew-
ing Co., 69 W. Va.. 94. 70 S. E. Ine8.
0 See "Impossibility pf Performance as an Excuse for Breach of Contract," by
FaD cxcK C. Woonw,mo r CoL. L. REv. .529; and "Intervening Impossibility of Per-
formance as Affecting the Obligations of Contracts." by WILLIAM C. CoNLE-, 66 Uxy.
op Pzxx. L. Rav. 28.
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ing discharge by intervening impossibility. This was the doctrine
of the "frustration of the venture," which arose in a group of cases
in which the parties had in fact contemplated the occurrence of
certain events; and the question presented for decision was not one
of impossibility, but of the true meaning and intent of the parties.
In one of the earlier cases in which this doctrine was applied a
charterparty was entered into by which it was agreed to deliver
certain freight at Hamburg, "restraints of princes and rulers * * *
always excepted." After the charterparty was made, and before
the time for performance, war broke out between Germany and
France, and the port of Hamburg was blockaded. It was held
that the blockade discharged the contract, and did not merely excuse
delay, on the ground that the contract contemplated not merely a
voyage at some indefinite time in the future, but a "commercial
speculation within a reasonable time.' 87  The same principle was
applied in an action on a policy of insurance. The question pre-
senteoI was whether there had been a loss of freight by the perils
of the seas. The ship had gone ashore and was in such condition
that it could not be repaired for some eight months. It was held
that this delay ended the commer6ial speculation for which the voy-
age was undertaken. 8 It is evident that cases of this sort do not
raise any question of impossibility. The true object of the contract
depends on the intention of the parties. The facts which will
operate as a discharge of the contract are expressly enumerated,
though in general terms. Whether the general terms include the
specific facts which have occurred is a matter of the construction
of the contract as a whole; and the true object of the contract will
be of great importance in ascertaining this intention.
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Instead of solving the questions of impossibility which arose out
of the War of 1914 on principles of impossibility of performance,
or by means of the analogies which they had already followed, the
English courts followed the analogy of these cases which construed
1Geipel v. Sinith. L. R. 7 0. B. D. 404-
Is Jackson v. Union Marine Ins. Co., L. Rt. zo C. P. ras. See also Dahl v. Nelson,
6 App. Cas. 38. and Becker v. London Assurance Corporation, [x18l A. C. xos [af-
firming (xo6) a X. B. x.61.
It is true that in Jackson v. Union Marine I n. Co., L. R. so C. P. x2.. the
stranding of the vessel might have operated as a discharge of the contract without any
express provision therefor. A similar result was reached in Nickoll v. Ashton, [19oX]
2 K. B. x26, on the ground that the quality of the vessel as a cargo carrying vessel was
destroyed and that the existence of the hull in a condition capable of repairs, but not
capable of use under the contract, was equivalent to a destruction of the subject-
matter. In other words, the tuality of the thing in question was so essentially a part
of the contract that when the quality ceased to exist the subject-matter was regarded as
ceasing to exist for purposes of performance.
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express provisions in charterparties and insurance policies, and they
attempted to solve questions of impossibility by the use of the doc-
trine of frustration of the venture.4  In making use of this anal-
ogy, the courts at times have attempted to identify the doctrine of
the frustration of the venture with the theory of the implied con-
dition of the continued existence of the person or thing.
41 They
40Embirico's v. Reid, [1914] 3 K. B. 45; Millar v. Taylor, [916] x K. B. 402;
:Scottish Navigation Co. v. Souter. [19171 1 Y B. 222 [reversing (xgz6) i K. B. 675
and (x916) x K. B. 429]; Anglo-Northern Trading Co. v. Jones, [1917] a K. B. 78;
Leiston Gas Co. v. Leiston-Cum-Sizewell Urban District Council, [1x96] '2 K. B. 4.28;
Horlock v. Beal, [xgx6l z A. C. 486 [reversing (xgxs) i K. B. 6271: F. A. Tamplin
Steamship Co. v. Anglo-Mexican Petroleum Products Co., [x196] 2 A. C. 397.
41, Leiston Gar Co. v. Leisron-Cum-Sizewell Urban District Council, [xgx6] 2 K. B.
428; F. A. Tamplin Steamship Co. v. Anglo-Mexican Petroleum Products Co., [zg96] 2
A. C. 397. "When a lawful contract has been made and there is no default, a court of
law has no power to discharge either party from the performance of it unless either
the rights of some one else or some Act of Parliament give the necessary jurisdiction.
But a court can and ought to examine'the contract and the circumstances in which
it was made, not of course to vary, but only to explain it, in order to see whether or
not from the nature of it the parties must have made their bargain on the footing
that a particular thing or state of things would continue to exist. And if they must have
done so, then a term to that effect will be implied, though it be not expressed in the
contract. In applying this rule it is manifest that such a term can rarely be implied
except where the discontinuance is such as to upset altogether the purpose of the
contract. Some delay or some change is very common in all human affairs, and it
cannot be supposed that any bargain has been made on the tacit condition that such a
thing will not happen in any degree.
"In the recent case of Horlock v. Beat ([z916] i A. C. 486) this house considered
the law upon this subject, and previous decisions were fully reviewed, especially in the
opinion delivered by Lord Atkinson. An examination, of those decisions confirms me
in the view that, when our courts have held innocent contracting parties absolved from
further performance of their promises, it has been upon the ground that there was an
implied term in the contract which entitled them to be absolved. Sometimes it is put
that performance has become impossible and that the party concerned did not promise
to perform an impossibility. Sometimes it is put that the parties contemplated a certain
state of things which fell out otherwise. In most of the cases it is said that there
was an implied condition in the contract which operated to release the parties from
performing it, and in all of them I think that was at bottom the principle upon which
the court proceeded. It is in my opihion the true principle, for no court has an
absolving power, but it can infer from the nature of the contract and the surrounding
circumstances that a condition which is not expressed was a foundation on which the
parties contracted.
"When this question arises in regard to commercial contracts, as -happened in Dahl
v. Nelson, Donkin & Co. ([1881] 6 App. Cas. 38), Geipel v. Smith (L. Rt. 7 Q. B. 404),
and Jackson v. Union Marine Insurance Co. (L. Rt. so C. P. 125) the principle is the
same, and the language used as to 'frustration of the adventure' merely adapts it to the
class of cases in hand. In all these three cases it was held, to use the language of
Lord Blackburn, 'that a delay in carrying out a charter-party, caused by something for
which neither party was responsible, if so great and long as to make it unreasonable
to require the parties to go on with the adventure, entitled either of them, at least
while the contract was executory, to consider it at an end.' That seems to me another
way of saying that from the nature of the contract it cannot be supposed the parties,
as reasonable men, intended it to be binding on them under such altered conditions.
Were the altered conditions such that, had they thought of them, they would have
taken their chance of them, or such that as sensible men they would have said 'if that
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have also attempted to identify the doctrine of the Roman law as
to obligations de certo corpore with the theory of the frustration
of the venture.
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happens, of course, it is all over between us?' What, in fact, was the true meaning of
the contract? Since the parties have not provided for the contingency, ought a court
to say it is obvious they would have treated the thing as at an end?
"Applying the principle to the present case, I find that these contracting parties
stipulated for the use of this ship during a period of five years, which would naturally
cover the duration of many voyages. Certainly both sides expected that these years
would be years of peace. They also expected, no doubt, that they would be left in
joint control of the ship, as agreed, and that they would not be deprived of it by any
act of state. But I cannot say that the continuance of peace or freedom from inter-
ruption in their use of the vessel was a tacit condition of this contract. On the con-
trary, one at all events of the parties might probably have thought, if he thought of it
at all, that war would enhance the value of the contract, and both would have been
considerably surprised to be told that interruption for a few months was to release
them both from a time charter that was to last five years. On the other hand, if the
interruption can be pronounced, in the language of Lord Blackburn already cited, 'so
great and long as to make it unreasonable to require the parties to go on with the
adventure,' then it would be different. Both of them must have contracted on the
footing that such an interruption as that would not take place, and I should imply a
condition to that effect. Taking into account, however, all that has happened, I cannot
infer that the interruption either has been or will be in this case such as makes it
unreasonable to require the parties to go on. There may be many months during which
this ship will be available for commercial purposes before the five years have expired.
It might be a valuable right for the charterer during those months to have the use
of this ship at the stipulated freight. Why should he be deprived of it? No one can
say that he will or that he will not regain the use of the ship, for it depends upon
contingencies which are incalculable. The owner will continue to receive the freight
he bargained for so long as the contract entitles him to it, and if, during the time for
which the charterer is entitled to the use of the ship, the owner received from the
Government any sums of money for the use of her, he will be accountable to the
charterer. Should the upshot of It all be loss to either party-and I do not suppose it
will be so-then each will lose according as the action of the Crown has deprived either
of the benefit he would otherwise have derived from the contract. It may be hard on
them as it was on the plaintiff in Appleby v. Myers (L. R. 2 C. P. 6sx). The violent
interruption of a contract always may damage one or both of the contracting parties.
Any interruption does so. Loss may arise to some one whether it be decided that these
people are or that they are not still bound by the charter party. But the test for
answering that question is not the loss that either may sustain. It is this: Ought we
to imply a condition in the contract that an interruption such as this shall excuse the
parties from further pierformance of it? I think not. I think they took their chance
of lessir interruptions, and the condition I should imply goes no further than that
they should be excused if substantially the whole contract became impossible of per-
formance, or in other words impracticable, by some cause for which neither was re-
sponsible. Accordingly I am of the opinion that this charter-party did not come to an
end when the steamer was requisitioned and that the requisition did not suspend it or
affect the rights of the owners or charterers under it, and that the appeal fails." F. A.
Tamplin Steamship Co. v. Anglo-Mexican Petroleum Products Co., [xg6] 2 A. C. 397.
"2Horack v. Beal. rxqi61 x A. C. 486 [reversing (0gxt) j K. B. 6271. "Several
of the citati'oq from the DiGonsT on this subiect are made by Blackburn. 3.. in the lead-
ing case of Tavlor v. Caldwell (.J B. & S.. 8a6. 835. 839). and one can entirely assent
to that very learned judge's view that the principle is adopted in the civil law as
applicable to every obligation of which the subiet is a thing certain. He cites Pothier
in support of a definition of much precision as follows: "The debtor corporir certi is
freed from his obligation when the thing has perished, neither by his act, nor his neg-
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It is possible that in these cases the English courts meant nothing
more, by the use of the expression "frustration of the venture,"
lect. and before he is in default, unless by some stipulation he has taken on himself the
risk of the particular misfortune which ha occurred.'
"In another passage of this judgment Blackburn. J.. remarks: 'In none of these
cases is the promise in words other than positive, nor is there any express stipulation
that the destruction of the person or thing shall excuse the performance: but that excuse
is by law impled, because from the nature of the contract it is apparent that the
gparties contracted on the basis of the continued existence of the particular person or
chattel.'
"In the course of laying down these principles the cases which had ocurred in the
English courts were referred to, and that of Williams v. Llnyd, (x628] W. Jones I79)
was especially founded on.
"it is manifest that the principle last adumbrated was capable of a wider practical.
and logical application than to the failure of a cerium corpus. The underlying ratio
is the failure of something which was at the basis of the contract in the mind and
intention of the contracting parties.
"This ratio has, I am humbly of opinion, been properly developed in recent years.
I do not go through all the decisions, but I think it right to mention that of Krell
([isosi a K. B. 74o. 748). in which I desire to attach my respectful and pointed con-
currence in the opinion delivered by Vaughan Williams. L. J.. in these passages:
'Whatever may have been the limits of the Roman law, the case of Nickoll v. Ashton
([sgo1] z K. B. 126) makes it plain that the English law applies the principle not only
to cases where the performance of the contract becomes impossible by the cessation of
existence of the thing which is the subject-matter of the contract, but also to cases
where the event which renders the contract incapable of performance is the cessation
or non-existence of an express condition or state of things going to the root of the
contract.'
"This view is fully discussed by the learned judge. I think it to be in entire
accord with that doctrine of frustration of voyage which has become fully accepted since
the case of Jackson v. Union Marine Insurance Co. (L. R. so C. P. xas) with the
doctrine underlying Taylor v. Caldwell (3 B. & S. 826), and with sound legal principle.
"Blackburn, J., in discussing the civil law, only cited DIGEST 45, 1, 33 and DIGEST
45, 1, 23, and confined his survey of that law to the failure of a corpus: cerium, develop-
ing the doctrine as it were from that point. And Vaughan Williams, L. J., reasons
upon the same limited premises, stating that 'the Roman law dealt with obligationes de
certo corpora.' The passages cited are from the book 'de verborum obligotion bus.' The
subject is too large for treatment here, but it may be said that the same principle
appears in book x8, 'de contrahenda emptione. Even in regard to book 45, however,
another text shows that the development and wider application of the principle was not
unknown to Roman jurists and was approved. It is DIGEST 45, x, 9x. After dealing
with the case of a slave, the ordinary illustration of a cerium corpus, and of his death
the review of the principle is broadened thus: 'Si sit quidem res in rebus humanir, sed
dari non possit, ut fundus retlgiosus, puta, vel sacer factus, vel servus manu-
missus, vel etiam ab hostibus si capiatur'-then in each of these instances liability under
the obligation flies off. if the occurrences do not arise from the promisor's fault. Mr.
Hunter in his invaluable work thus paraphrases the dictum as to the sale of a piece of
land (ROMAx LAw, p. 638): 'Sempronius promises to give a small plot of ground to
Maevius. After doing so, he buries a dead body in the place, and thus makes the land
extra-commercium. Sempronis must pay its value. If the land had belonged to
another, who had buried a body in it, he would have been released!
"The illustration is not inapt even to the present case, for it shows that it was no
answer to say 'the land, the cerium corpus, is there,' for the land having through no
fault of the promisor become extra commercium, by burial of the dead, then the basis
of the transaction, the root of the contract as that had been contemplated by the parties,
bad gone, 'or had suffered such an alteration as to release them from the obligation
MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW
than they had already decided as a part of the doctrine of impossi-
bility of performance; namely, that impossibility, in order to operate
as a discharge, must, like other forms of discharge without the
agreement of the parties, either cause a total failure of considera-
tion or at least must affect the vital and essential provisions of the
contract."8 If this is the meaning intended, the only serious incon-
itself. This was a cast analogous to that of the slave who was still alive but had been
manumitted or had been captured by the enemy. It is thus not without interest to
observe that not only bad the principle been laid down, but its modern development
had been foreshadowed in Roman times.
"The application of the principle in'the present case can, in my opinion, lead to
only one result, namely, that a dissolution of the relation of master and servant oc-
curred in the case of Coralie Horlock upon the declaration of war between Germany and
Britain. The vessel being then in the port of Hamburg, remains there; her master,
officers, and crew are interned as prisoners; the voyage and adventure contemplated
have been brought to an end. No light is thrown upon the €luestion by illustrations of
contracts of service which have been terminated, say, by a bankruptcy or a cessation
of business: in.such cases the servant, having lost his employment, is able to say, 'I am
here, willing and able to render the service contracted for.' In the present case these
ideas would be fictional: the ship cannot be navigated, no orders in that regard by the
master could be obeyed, and the crew, unhappily, is prevented by hostile force from
rendering the ship any service whatsoever. In such circumstances I do not see my way
to hold the seaman -to be entitled in law to wages which, through no fault of the
owners, he is entirely unable to earn by" service. Such cases, no doubt, will take
their rank among the many desolating circumstances which demand remedial attention
at the hand of Parliament or the Executive power." Horlock v. Beal, [xig6] x A. C.
486, freversing (x15) 3 F. B. 6271.
'3Both'English and American courts had agreed that the impossibility of perform-
ance of one of a number of covenants was to be solved by applying the test which was
usually applied in cases of breach; namely, was the covenant, the performance of which
became impossible, an essential, vital and material part of the contract, or was it a
minor and subsidiary provision? If it was a vital covenant, subsequent impossibility
operated as a discharge of the entire contract. Ottawa v. Ottawa Electric Ry. Co., i Ont.
Law Rep. 377; Macon & Birmingham, Ry. Co. v. Gibson, 85 Ga. 1, 2z Am. St. Rep. 135,
xx S. E. 44z; Baltimore & Ohio Ry. v. Miller, x83 Ind. 323, 107 N. E. 545; Louirsville
& Nashville Ry. v. Crowe, 156 Ky. 27, 49 L. R. A. (N.S.) 848, x6o S. E. 759; Amer-
icon Mercantile Exchange v. Blunt, ioz Me. 128, 12o Am. St. Rep. 463, 1o L. R. A.
(N.S.) 414, 66 Atl. 21z; Standard Brewing Co. v. Weil, 129 Md. 487, L. R. A. 1917-C,
929, 99 Atl. 66r; Halloran v. Schmidt Brewing Co., 137 Minn. 14z, L. R. A. 1917-E,
777, 16z N. W. xo82; Brown v. Dillahunty, x2 Miss. (4 Sm. & M.) 713, 43 Am. Dec.
499; Heart v. East Tennessee Brewing Co., 1x Tenn. 69, 13o Am. St. Rep. 753, 19
L. R. A. N.S.) 964, 113 S. W. 364; Cowley v. Northern Pacific Ry., 68 Wash. 558,
41 L. R. A. (N.S.) 559, 123 Bac. 998; The Stratford v. Seattle Brewing & Malting Co.,
94 Wash. 125; L. R. A. 1917-C, 931, x62 Pac. 31; Koen v. Fairmont Brewing Co., 69
W. Va. 94, 70 S. E. 1098.
On the other hand, impossibility of performing a minor, subsidiary and relatively
immaterial covenant did not operate as a discharge of the entire contract. Standard
Brewing Co. v. Weil, z29 Md. 487, L. R. A. 1917-C, 929, 99 At]. 66x; Williams v. Vander-
bilt, 28 N. Y. 2z7, 84 Am. Dec. 333; Crouch v. Southern Surety Co., 13z Tenn. 26o,
L. R. A. zgxs-D, 966, 174 S. W. 1x6; Brown v. Ehlinger, 90 Wash. 585, z56 Pac. 544.
A lease of realty for a number of purposes, including its use for the sale of intoxi-
cating liquor, is not discharged by subsequent legislation or constitutional provisions
which forbid itq use for the sale of intoxicating lionor. O'Bvrne v. Henley. 161 Ala.
62o. 23 L. R. A. (N.S.) 496. so So. 83: Lawrence v. White. 1.3x Ia. 840. ig Am. & Eng.
Ann. Cas. 1097. 1o L. R. A. (N.S.) o66. 6. S. E. 63,: J. 1. Goodrum Tobacco Co. v.
IMPOSSIBILITY OF PERFORMANCE
venience which the use of the term will cause will be a danger of
confusion of terms. As in the case of the fiction of the implied
condition, the real danger is one of confusion of thought. In deter-
mining questions of impossibility on the theory of the frustration
of the venture, the English courts have, as a matter of fact, cited
and followed cases in which the doctrine was invoked as a means
of ascertaining the intention of the parties under specific contrac-
tual provisions."
The possibilities which the doctrine of frustration of the venture
may contain when used to solve question of pure impossibility may
be illustrated by a case 5 in which the court took the position that
the doctrine of frustration could apply only "where the object
which both parties have in view is frustrated"; and that while the
detention of the vessel frustrated the object of the charterer, which
was to make use of it, it did not frustrate the object of the owner,
which was to receive the hire to be paid for the vessel by the char-
terer. This case is saved, however, from being a reductio ad
absurdum of the doctrine of the frustration of the venture by the
fact that it was reversed by the Court of Appeal" on the ground
that the parties had contemplated a definite voyage, that by the
Potts-Theont son Liauor Co., 1.1.s Ga. 776. z6 L. R. A. (N.S.) A,8. 66 S. E. Xo81: Baugh-
man v. Portman, (Kv.) 14 S. W. U2. x2 Ky. L. Reo. 342: Shrevelmrt Ice & Brewing
Co. v. Mandel, 128 La. 314. .4 So. 8:4:. Standard Brewing Co. v. Weil. X29 Md. 487.
L IL A. zoxp-C. 929. oo At. 661: Gaston v. Gordon, x98 Mass. z6.. 04 N. E. 307;
San Antonio Brening A..rociation v. Brents. so Tex. Cv. App. 4s. 88 S. W. 368: Hecht
v. Acme Coal Co., io Wvom. 18. Ann. Can. 19z.-E. 258. 34 1"- . A. (N.S.) 77.1. 11.
Pac. 788. 117 PaC. 132. The lessee cannot insist on an abatement of rent. Fleming v.
King. ion Ga. 449. 28 S. E. 239: Chriian .Moerlein Bretisg Co. v. Roser, 169 Ky. igs.
18.4 S. W. 479: TAvlor v. Finnigan. x8o Mass. .68. 2 L. R. A. (N.S.) 97.1. 76 N. E. 2o:
Teller v. Bnoyle, 132 Pa. St- 56. x8 Atl. in6o: Miller v. Maguire. 18 R. . 77n. 3o At.
966: Kellogg v. Lnwe, .48 Wash. 203. 70 L. R. A. sso. 80 Pac. 458. By analogy. a
lease of realty which passes an interest in the land is not discharged by the subsequent
destruction of the buildings on such realty. Hare v. Groves," 3 Anstr. 687- Ware v.
Hobbs, 222 Mass. j27. 2xo N. E. 963: Bowen v. Clemens, x6x Mich. 493. x26 N. W. 639;
Linn v. Ross, 1o Oio 412. .6 Am. Dec. 9s; Moline v. Portland Brezing Co., 73 Or.
532, 144 Pac. 572. Even if the covenant, the performance of which is rendered im-
possible, is a vital covenant, it has been held that the contract is not discharged if
the party for whose benefit such covenant is inserted is willing to waive performance
thereof and to accept performance of the rest of the contract as full satisfaction there-
of. Hallett v. Parker, 68 N. H. 598, 39 At!. 433; Chapman v. Belts, 48 W. Va. r,
35 S. E. 1013.
As breach of an independent covenant does not discharge the contract, the im-
possibility of performing an independent covenant does not discharge the remaining
covenants of such contract Varney v. Cole, 114 Me. 329, 96 Atl. 232.
"Geipel v. Smith, L. R. 7 Q. B. D. 404; Jackson v. Union Marine Ins. Co., L. R.
Io C. P. 1aS.
46Scottish Navigation Co. v. Souter, [x916] i K. B. 675 (containing a 'restraint of
princes' clause).
"Scottish Navigation Co. v. Souter, [1917] 1 K. B. 222.
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terms of the charter the vessel could not be used for any other
voyage, and that the object of the voyage had been frustrated by
the detention of the vessel in a Russian port by the Russian gov-
ernment to avoid capture by German cruisers. Under the applica-
tion given to the doctrine of the frustration of the venture by the
trial court, the whole subject of impossibility might well be written
off in our law as a total loss; for few contracts there are in which
it can be said that the object of one of the parties, in receiving the
benefit of the contract, is frustrated if the adversary party can be
compelled to pay.
Comparatively few cases involving questions of impossibility
caused by the war have as yet come before the courts of this coun-
try. In cases in which a British vessel which had been chartered
by its owner and had been taken by the British government, the
American courts recognized the existence of the doctrine of frus-
tration of the venture. 7 It is spoken of as "the modem doctrine
of frustration ;,,48 and yet it is at the same time identified with the
doctrine of the implied condition.
9 As the question of the effect
of a requisition by the English government upon an English vessel
might 'well be solved by English law, the tendency of the American
courts to follow the English cases, as to their reasoning, though
possibly not as to their results, is not unnatural.
Whether the doctrine of frustration of the venture is treated as
a new idea in the law of impossibility, or whether it is merely a
new name for an old idea, its use has not resulted in certainty or
simplicity. The doctrine of the frustration of the venture has been
applied to many different classes of contracts, including contracts
the performance of which is forbidden by the specific order of
the government; contracts the performance of which is forbidden
by embargo, official detention and the like; contracts the perform-
ance of which will involve the risk of seizure as prize or contra-
band which was not contemplated when the contract was made;
and contracts for personal services in which the outbreak of war
has caused an increase in personal danger to the party who under-
takes to perform such contract, which was not contemplated when
the contract was made. The practical results of attempting to
4T Earn Line Stearwhip Co. v. Sutherland Stern-s*p Co., 254 Fed. r26; The Isle
of Mull, 2s7 Fed. 798.
"1 The Isle of Mull. ;257 Fed. 7o8.
" Earn Line SteamhiP Co. v. Sutherland Steamship Co.. 2.54 Fed. 126; 
The Isle of
Mull. a27 Fed. 798.
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apply the doctrine of the frustration of the venture can best be
seen, however, in cases in which a vessel which had been chartered
by its owner was requisitioned by the government.
In applying the doctrine of the frustration of the venture to con-
tracts in which vessels which had been chartered for a certain
length of time were taken by the government before the expiratior.
of the charter, it was generally conceded that the requisition by the
'government discharged the owner from any liability because of his
inability to furnish the vessel for the period during which the gov-
ernment was making use of it; and the question of the frustration
of the venture was used only to determine the 'effect of such requi-
sition by the government on the charter itself. If such requisition
involved the use of the vessel by the government for a substantial
period of time, would it suspend the charterparty for the time dur-7
ing which the government made use of the vessel, or would it dis-
charge the contract entirely? The English courts attempted to
solve this under the doctrine of the frustration of the venture by
comparing the time for which the charterparty was to run at the
time that the vessel was taken by the government, and the time for
which the government took the vessel, or if no time was fixed, the
time for which it appeared probable that the government was takVng
the vessel. As a result of this doctrine, the fact that a vessel was
requiFstioned by the government was held not to operate necessarily
as a discharge of a preeixisting charterparty.
5 0 If the period for
which the charterparty was to run at the time that the vessel was
taken by the government was so long that there would probably be
a substantial period of time after the government had ceased using
the vessel during which the charterer could make use of it, requi-
sition by the government was held to suspend the contract and not
to discharge it. In the leading case on this subject during the Wai
of 1914, a vessel was chartered for sixty months under a charter-
party which conferred upon the charterer the right to sublet such
steamer to the Admiralty or fbr other purposes, and which con-
tained an exception, among other things, of arrests and restraint
of princes. It was held that such charterparty was not discharged
by the fact that the Admiralty requisitioned such steamer when
the original charterparty had three years to run, even though the
vessel was chartered as a tank steamship for the transportation of
oil and it was altered by the Admiralty so as to serve as a trans'port
-1 F. A. TamPlin SleamishP Co. v. Angl-Mexicos Petroleum Products Co.. gz9z6l
2 A. C. 397 [affirming (xix6) x K. B. 485 which affirmed (191S) 3 K. B. 668]; Modero
Transport Co. v. Duneric Steamship Co., E1917 1z M B. 370 [affirming (xgx6) z K. B.
7a61; Chinese Mixing and Engineerino Co. v. Sale, t1917.1 2 K. B. 50q.
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for troops.5 1 In this case the charterer wished to treat the charter-
party as in effect, to pay the freight agreed upon, and to receive
from the government the compensation paid for the use of such
vessel.
Questions of impossibility should not depend upon the question
of the relative benefit which either party will receive if the contract
is either treated as discharged or treated as in effect; and accord-
ingly, it was held' in a subsequent case that requisition by the Ad-
miralty would not necessarily discharge the charterparty, although
the amount paid by the government was considerably less than the
amount to be paid by the charterer.52 In this case a charterparty
for twelve calendar months was held not to be discharged by the fact
that the vessel was requisitioned by the government when the orig-
inal charter had ten months to run.53 Charterparties for three ves-
sels for five years each were held not to be discharged by the requi-
sition of such vessels by the Admiralty when the charter had from
two to four years to run.'
If the charterparty had a short time to run when compared witl
the probable period for which the government would use the ves-
sel, the venture was held to be frustrated; and the charterparty was
discharged and not merely suspended. A charterparty which had
about five months to run has been held to be discharged by the
requisition of the vessel by the Admiralty, at least if it was under-
stood that the vessel was requisitioned for the entire period of the
war, and if it was also understood that the war would probably last
beyond the duration of the charterparty.55 A charterparty was held
to be discharged by the requisition of such vessel by the Admiralty
when the charterparty had about four months to run.5 A contract
by which a vessel was to be chartered for twelve months after it
was delivered, which gave to the charterers the option to terminate
the contract if the vessel was not delivered at the time agreed upon,
was held to be discharged by the requisition of such vessel by the
Admiralty before such time for delivery. 7
a' F. A. Tamplin SteamshiP Co. v. Anglo-Mexican Petroleum Products Co. [x9x6] 2
A. C. 397 [affirming (1916) 1 . B. 485 which affirmed (9x5) 3 K. B. 668].
52Modern Transport Co. v. Duneric Steamship Co. [19171 1 K. B. 370 fafflrming
(x9x6) x K B. 7261.
3
m
Modern Transport Co. v. Duneric Steamship Co. [x9x7 K. B. 370 [affirming
(r916) x it. B. 7261.
64 Chinese Mining and Engineerino Co. v. Sale. [1917] 2 K. B. !99.
w Countess of Wartuick Steamship Co. v. Le Nickel Socikte Anonyme, [x918] I K
B. 372.
' OAnglo-Northern Tradino Co. v. Jones. [1Q07] 2 K. B. 78.
57Bank Line v. Capel, [1919l A. C. 43.
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The reaction which the doctrine of the frustration of the venture
causes depends largely on the mental characteristics and previous
training of the court or the lawyer whose reaction is tested. The
English courts assume the applicability of the doctrine of the frus-
tration of the venture to cases of impossibility arising during the
War of 1914, without discussion; 58 and the English writers on the
subject have made the same assumption.59 Indeed, the use of the
analogy of the frustration of the venture and the adoption of that
principle into the common law doctrine of impossibility has been
compared to the reception of the law merchant in Mansfield's day.
60
The American courts have seemed less sure of their ground; and
they have even suggested that war is an abnormal condition which
may not recur, and that no great harm will come if the courts
decide the questions as they arise without laying down any general
rule on which they can base their decisions.6 ' If this is to be the
method of solving problems of impossibility, it affords some justi-
fication for the statement that "the tendency of every body of law
which rests upon precedent is to develop into a chaotic mass of
formless pseudo-equity.""2
Those who have thought and written on the subject have taken
positions which range from regarding the incorporation of the doc-
trine of the frustration of the venture into the law of impossibility
as an eminently wise and normal development of the law,6 to re-
" F. A. Tamplin Steamhip Co. v. Anglo-Mexican Petroleum Products Co., [19161
2 A. C. 397 [affirming (zsg6) I K. B. 48.5 which afrmed (915) 3 K. B. 668]: Bank
Line v. Capel, [:9:9] A. C. 435; Modern Transport Co. v. Duneric Steamship Co, [i9:T]
K . B. 370 [affirming (:OW61 : K. B. 7261: Anglo-Northern Trdaing Co. v. Jones,
[19171 2 K. B. 78: Chinese Mining & Engineering Co. v. Sale, [19171 2 K. B. 599;
Countess of Warwick SleaiMnhip Co. v. Le Nickel Snceity Atwnyme. E9s8i I K. B.
372.
as See "War-time" Impossibility of Performance of Contract." by AxioLD D. McNAIR,
35 LAW Q. FRv. 84.
0 See "War-time Impossibility of Performance of Contract." by ARoLD D. Mc-
NA R, 35 LAW Q. REy. S4.
41 "After all. the class of cases to which this belongs is incidental to the Great
War. The world has not seen anything like it for :oo years. Everyone everywhere
is praying and planning that it shall be the last great clash of arms. Nevertheless it is
not unreasonable to hope that a century may pass before we have another. No great
harm may come if we do fail to lay down a general rule for the determination of con-
troversies which seldom arise, except when a cataclysmic disturbance engulfs the world."
The Isle of Mull, 257 Fed. 798.
e "The Need of Law Reform" (I--"The Doctrine of Frustration of Adventure"); 38
CANADIAw LAW TiMas 86. 151, 223.
13 See "War-time Impossibility of Performance of Contract" by Aazow D. McNAxst
35 LAw Q. R-. 84.
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garding it as a conclusive indication that the entire doctrine of
impossibility of performance ought to be abolished and that a party
who is prevented from performing his covenant ought to be com-
pelled to pay damages for such nonperformance.6'
Both views would seem to be hasty and ill-considered. The
authorities which have taken the position that the doctrine of the
frustration of the venture should be a part of the law of impossi-
bility of performance have never thought it necessary to give any
reasons for sucoh belief. Whether the doctrine of impossibility of
performance should be abolished or not cannot be determined defi-
nitely until we have given it a fair chance to develop its own prin-
ciples, unencumbered by false and misleading analogies drawn from
cases which were solved by ascertaining the intention of the parties.
It is usually a mistake to call a thing that which it is not-at least
it does not make for clear thinking. -If the results which are
reached in determining questions of impossibility are far from
harmonious, this is due in part to the inherent difficulties of the
subject, and in part to the fact that the courts have been attempting
to apply the doctrine of the implied condition and the doctrine of
the frustration of the venture concurrently with principles of impos-
sibility. Impossibility is a stvbject difficult enough from its very
nature. The difficulties are increased enormously when there is,
at the outset, but one chance in three that a case of impossibility
will be solved by an application of the principles of impossibility.
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